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It must remain incomprehensible to us that we,
 the victims of the recent Germany, 
must again sleep on straw mattresses.
Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, 
Representatives of the Shanghai Group1 
“Back on Straw”: The Experience of Shanghai Jewish 
Refugees in Bremen after Escaping German National 
Socialism, Enduring a Japanese “Designated Area”, 
and Fleeing Chinese Communism 
The Arrival of the Shanghai Group
On Sunday, 3 July 1950 the U.S. Army Transporter General Sturgis arrived 
from New York to the German port of Bremerhaven carrying 106 refugees. These 
refugees disembarked after a three‑month journey that had taken them from 
China through the United States of America. The majority of the members of 
what would become known as the “Shanghai Group” (Shanghai‑Gruppe) were 
Jews who had fled the Nazis for Shanghai, China. Given the city’s long tradition 
of not requiring an entry visa, Shanghai had become the last safe haven when the 
countries of the world (including the United States) had closed their doors to the 
Jews. In China the new “stateless” Jews had attempted to start a new life only 
to find that the persecution that had forced them to flee their homeland eventu‑
ally caught up to them on the other side of the globe. During the course of the 
Second Sino‑Japanese War, much of China, including Shanghai, was occupied 
by Japanese forces. In February 1943 the Japanese occupation forces in Shanghai 
1 Letter from Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Breyhan, 7 XI 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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decreed that all “stateless” persons who had arrived in China after 1 January 1937 
were to be placed into a “Designated Area”2 in the Hongkou3 section of the city. 
As a result, approximately 18,000–20,000 Jews were interned in the Designated 
Area, of whom some 15,000 were still alive at the end of the war.
 After the war many of those who had been interned in the Designated Area 
decided to immigrate to the United States and were successful in doing so.4 
Some of the Shanghai Jews stayed in Shanghai and once again tried to rebuild 
their lives. However, China was anything but a stable environment in which 
to do so, as the Communists and the Nationalists fought over control of the 
country. After the Communists eventually won this war, most of the remaining 
Jewish refugees decided to leave with hopes of moving to the United States. In 
April 1949, however, the United States had closed its consulate office in China. 
In Spring 1950 a group of 106 Jews decided to head out to the United States. 
The International Refugee Organization was able to procure a ship to carry 
these refugees on their journey. The SS General Gordon left Tientsin (Tianjin) 
on 24 April 1950.5 It voyaged to Hong Kong, Manila, Yokohama, and Honolulu 
and eventually arrived in San Francisco on 25 May 1950. The question that 
arose, however, when they arrived was whether the United States would accept 
these refugees. It should be noted that in the years immediately following 
the Second World War, American immigration policy toward Jews did start 
to open up.6 President Truman had taken the lead in this regard, starting with 
a directive in December 1945 that expanded the number of displaced persons 
2 “Designated Area” has been used throughout the text except for when “Ghetto” was used 
by the refugees in their testimonies. “Designated Area” was the official term for the area. Although 
the Designated Area has often been referred to as a “Ghetto” in the historiography, the Designated 
Area in Shanghai was not technically a ghetto due to the fact that the Jews lived amongst the 
Chinese population in Hongkou. 
3 The Pinyin “Hongkou” has been used throughout the text, including the translations of 
refugee testimonies.
4 The description of the journey presented in this section is based on the reports given in the 
Bremen newspapers Weser‑Kurier and Bremer Nachrichten; “Last Hope Gone, Refugees Must 
Sail for Europe,” Chicago Tribune, 20 VI 1950; “108 D.P.’s From Shanghai Win a 12‑Day Respite 
on Deportation,” New York Times, 29 V 1950; “All Hope Vanishes for 106 D.P’s Here,” New 
York Times, 20 VI 1950; “Truman Speeding Refugees’ Return,” New York Times, 21 VI 1950; 
“106 Refugees Sail for German Camp,” New York Times, 22 VI 1950; and the account provided 
in James R. Ross,  Escape to Shanghai: A Jewish Community in China (New York: The Free Press, 
1994), 250–253.
5 Historian James R. Ross notes that this was the last such voyage and explains that they had 
to take a train to Tientsin and then be taken out to the General Gordon on a barge. Ross, Escape 
to Shanghai, 250–251.
6 On the restrictive measures during the war see David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the 
Jews: America and the Holocuast, 1941–1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 124–142 and Carl J. Bon 
Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 18–21.
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that could enter the country.7 It was under Truman’s guidance (and in the face 
of restrictionist opposition) that the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 had opened 
the doors for some 202,000 persons (of whom over 40,000 were Jews).8 The prob‑
lem that faced the 106 Jews from Shanghai was that they did not possess entry 
visas and for this reason they were immediately put onto a train in San Francisco 
and sent directly to New York. In New York the refugees were to board the Gene‑
ral Ballou but their departure was delayed and, through the assistance of Jewish 
organizations, they were permitted to stay on Ellis Island until government officials 
(under pressure from the Jewish organizations) decided whether they would be 
allowed to stay in the United States. Eventually the decision was made that the 
Shanghai Jews would have to leave. This decision was based on the grounds that 
American entry visas could only be granted by American consulates in foreign 
countries as well as the fact that America had a strict quota of only 4,000 refugees 
from China. After two and a half weeks, the news came from the State Department 
that the Shanghai Jews would have to go. Last minute attempts to receive entry visas 
in Canada or Cuba were unsuccessful and the refugees boarded the General  Sturgis 
for Germany. President Truman had taken a personal interest in the plight of the 
106  refugees and contacted the United States High Commissioner in Germany, 
John J. McCloy, to designate the refugees as temporary residents when they got 
to Bremen so as to fast‑track them toward admission to the United States.9 Ironically, 
during the very month in which the Shanghai Jews stayed in the United States, an 
extension of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was passed with a new goal of admit‑
ting approximately 415,000 persons.10 Nevertheless, if the Shanghai Jews wanted 
to join these numbers of new immigrants, they would first have to go to Germany.
The arrival of the Shanghai Group in July 1950 had been set up in advance 
by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer had informed the Mayor 
of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen, and had requested that Bremen accommodate the 
refugees. When the Shanghai Jews arrived in Bremerhaven, they were greeted 
by the European director of the American Joint Distribution Committee, Charles 
H. Jordan, who had already looked after the refugees in Shanghai. The refugees 
were then transported to the Bremen International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
Camp Tirpitz, where they were greeted by Mayor Kaisen and Undersecretary 
Dr. Kleeberg, who acted as Adenauer’s representative.11 
7 Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 
1882 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 103. Daniels points out that based on a Gallop poll, Tru‑
man’s directive was not in tune with the sentiment of the American populace and “showed some 
courage” on his part.
8 Daniels, Guarding the Gold Door, 103.
9 “Truman Speeding Refugees’ Return,” New York Times, 21 VI 1950.
10 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 109.
11 That it was Kleeberg who represented Adenauer comes from Telegram by Gotthardt, 
5 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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As the Shanghai Group arrived in Bremen, newspapers were running stories 
on the emerging conflict in Korea and a new historical era known as the Cold 
War was emerging. Along with the shift of course in geopolitics, the German 
stance toward Jews was turning. The arrival of the 106 Jewish refugees put 
one question front and center: What debt did the Germans owe Jews who 
had fled to Shanghai, China and had been forced to live within a Designated 
Area by the Japanese occupying forces? While it was true that the hardships 
that these Jewish refugees had endured in China had been at the hands of 
the Japanese, the reason they had had to flee to Shanghai in the first place 
was clear: due to their persecution at the hands of the Nazi regime. Given 
the interest of Chancellor Adenauer in their plight, it looked initially as if the 
Germans would start making amends. In fact, during the previous year, 
Adenauer had made his first public comments on Jewish relations in the 
Bundestag. Nevertheless his comments were awkward and critics had focused 
more on what he had failed to say on the issue than on anything else.12 The 
fact of the matter was that the question of Jewish reparations in Germany had 
not yet been resolved. The first reparations of any kind started with a policy 
to reclaim Jewish property in the American Zone in 1948. This would be 
followed by fledgling programs and policies in various German states in the 
West.13 The Luxemburg Agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Israel would not be signed until September 1952. Thus, when the Shanghai 
Group arrived in Bremen in July 1950, there was not much of a road map 
to follow with respect to compensating Jews for the misdeeds of the German 
past. It appeared though that both Adenauer and Kaisen knew that something 
needed to be done with respect to this group of Jewish refugees.
Shifting the Focus within the Historiography
To date the historiography of the Shanghai Jews has largely been focused on 
the Jewish experience in the Designated Area primarily through the publication 
of memoir accounts by those who survived the ordeal.14 The subject received its 
first substantial scholarly treatment in David Kranzler’s trailblazing work of 1976, 
12 Jay Howard Geller, Jews in Post‑Holocaust Germany, 1945–1953 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 186–187.
13 Menachem Z. Rosensaft and Joana D. Rosensaft, “The Early History of German‑Jewish 
Reparations,” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 25, Issue 6, 2001, S‑2.
14 See, for example, Ernest G. Heppner, Shanghai Refuge: A Memoir of the World War II Jewish 
Ghetto (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993) and the collection of accounts in Berl Falbaum, 
ed., Shanghai Remembered: Stories of Jews Who Escaped to Shanghai from Nazi Europe (Royal Oak, 
Mich.: Momentum Books, 2005)
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Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945.15 
In recent years more and more scholars and even filmmakers have turned to the 
topic. Perhaps most significantly, in 2007 a museum dedicated to the history of the 
Shanghai Jews was opened in Shanghai. The museum has not only been spreading 
awareness of the history of the Shanghai Jews within China but also throughout 
the world with its travelling exhibition. This exhibition has appeared most recently 
in Stuttgart during November 2013. It is fair to say that the historiography of the 
subject has arrived at a point where the Jewish experience in Shanghai has been 
recorded in great detail.16 The challenge that now presents itself is for scholars 
to either start approaching the history from new perspectives or to expand the 
temporal boundaries of the history to include the consequences of the Jewish 
refugee experience on subsequent history. With respect to perspective, historian 
Gao Bei has broken new ground in her 2013 book Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese 
and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish Refugees during World War II .17 Here 
Gao eschews what she says has been a hitherto myopic, even “Eurocentric”, focus 
on the Jews.18 By contrast she explores the subject of the Jews in Shanghai from 
the perspective of Japanese and Chinese officials. In effect, she has done much 
to show that there were more roles for the Chinese and the Japanese in this history 
than simply those of faceless coolies and the sadistic Kano Ghoya, respectively.19 
With respect to the consequences of the Jewish refugee experience, coverage 
has predominantly been limited to the specific life stories of individuals or 
individual families in the post‑War years or coverage of Jewish refugee reunions 
in the United States. This, for example, is the way in which the Shanghai Jewish 
Refugee Museum presents the post‑1945 history. Post‑War coverage then tends 
to jump to the significance of the history of the Shanghai Jews for present‑day 
relations between China and Israel and of the restored Ohel Moshe Synagogue 
in Shanghai as a symbolic focal point of commemoration for world leaders. 
To date there has been little written on the subsequent impact of the Shanghai 
15 David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis & Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai,  1938–
1945 (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1976).
16 The high water mark in the description of the Shanghai Jewish experience has recently been 
reached with Steve Hochstadt, Exodus to Shanghai: Stories of Escape from the Third Reich (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
17 Gao Bei, Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish Refugees 
during World War II (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
18 Gao, Shanghai Sanctuary, 7.
19 “Coolie” was the word used for members of the poor, laboring class, which comprised the 
overwhelming majority of the population in the Hongkou District. Ghoya was the diminutive 
Japanese official who was in charge of distributing passes that allowed Jews to leave the Designated 
Area on a temporary basis. Ghoya was an unstable man who was wont to humiliate and physically 
harm Jews for no apparent reason other than for personal pleasure. Ghoya, who called himself the 
“King of the Jews,” would become the face of the Japanese people to many of the Jewish refugees 
in Shanghai.
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experience on the relations between Jews and Germany. The question arises as 
to what extent Germany was ever held accountable for the loss and misfortune 
experienced by those Jews who had had to flee the country to China. One is 
struck  by the absence of such discussion of German‑Jewish relations in the 
post‑1945 period both within printed works and in the displays at the Shanghai 
Jewish Refugee Museum. 
The Significance of the Shanghai Group for Historians
By following the narrative of the arrival of 106 Jewish refugees in Bremen in 1950 
we can start to move beyond the specific confines of the Designated Area and 
explore the consequences of the history of the Shanghai Jews for Jewish‑German 
relations. The arrival of the Shanghai Group was obviously seen at the time to be 
important (as Chancellor Adenauer’s personal interest attests). Nevertheless, 
the Shanghai Group arrived at a time before an official reparations agreement 
between Germany and Israel had been settled and it was by no means clear what 
was to be done for the Shanghai Jews. The present article is intended to serve 
as the first step in documenting the history of the Shanghai Jewish Refugee 
experience after the Jews left China. Given that the article is breaking new 
ground, its main focus is placed more on providing foundational information 
than conclusive interpretation. The article is based on a large file (4,22/2–178) 
devoted to the Shanghai Group that is located in the Bremen State Archives. 
The file is comprised of documents produced by the Chancellor’s Office, the 
Federal Ministry of Finance, the Federal Ministry of Interior, and the Bremen 
Senate. The file also contains the correspondence of representatives from the 
Shanghai Group with various government officials. The hope is that the article 
will stimulate more research in this direction. Although the article is centered 
on the negotiations of the Jewish refugees with German officials during the early 
1950s, the main source upon which it is based does reveal important details 
of the refugees’ past experiences (both within Nazi Germany and Shanghai). 
The context for this was that the Jewish refugees were documenting these 
experiences in order to justify their demands for restitution from Germany. 
The significance of this for scholars is that the accounts provided within their 
correspondence with the German officials constitute some of the earliest 
chronicles of the horrors they experienced both within Germany and China. 
For the purposes of this brief article, the accounts of the refugee experience 
in Nazi Germany and life in Shanghai have been limited to a narrative of the 
concentration camp experiences of thirteen of the members of the Shanghai 
Group and translations of three of the fullest refugee accounts of Shanghai. With 
respect to the post‑Shanghai history, the article depicts the journey to Bremen, 
the names (and birthdates when available) of 104 members of the Shanghai 
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Group, the number of the Shanghai refugees in Bremen over time, the health 
status of the members, the conditions in the Tirpitz Camp in Bremen, and the 
activities of German federal and state officials to address the immediate needs 
of the Shanghai Jewish refugees during the time when the issue of German 
reparation payments to Jews had yet to be determined.
 The arrival of the refugees in Bremen occurred at the time when the 
government of the new Federal Republic of Germany was only beginning 
to navigate its way through the tricky waters of German‑Jewish relations 
in the wake of the Holocaust and the documents reveal a certain tension  as 
government officials tried to figure out how to respond to the awkward 
presence of the Shanghai Group. Ultimately, the examination of the plight of 
the Shanghai Group in Bremen during 1950–1952 reveals that despite the initial 
good intentions of Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Kaisen, the less than ideal 
accommodations and foot‑dragging on the part of various government offices 
ultimately meant that the Germans missed an early opportunity to show that 
they were genuinely interested in atoning for the sins of their immediate past. 
The Jewish refugees grew increasingly frustrated as days turned into weeks and 
weeks into months and the best Germany had to offer them was straw. The time 
when Germans really started to confront their dark past would come well after 
the last members of the Shanghai Group had already left.20
Who Were the Members of the Shanghai Group? 
The Shanghai Group was comprised of 106 Jewish refugees. The overwhelming 
majority of the group originally came from Germany. Eight of the members came 
from Austria and one was from Italy.21 Most of the Jews had journeyed to Shang‑
hai via Italy on ships of the Lloyd Triestino.22 Three members of the group were 
children who had been born in China. Of the 106 members of the group, 87 had 
actually been detained in the Shanghai Designated Area. The remaining had lived 
in different cities in China.23 The names of 104 (and the birthdates for 77) of the 
20 Although not the main focus of the article, the history of the Shanghai Group also shows yet 
another unfortunate consequence of the restrictive immigration policies of the United States; the 
said policies prolonged the refugee experience for these mostly elderly and/or infirm persons. As 
such, the article provides additional testimony against U.S. policy as the one provided so effectively 
in Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews. 
21 Report by Breyhan sent to Dr. Vialon, 29 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
22 For descriptions of such journeys, see Ross, Escape to Shanghai, esp. 51. In Ross’s work the 
experience of the Heimann family (of whom Gustav Heimann, Julie Heimann, and Sally (or Saly) 
Pape would later find themselves in the Tirpitz Camp in Bremen) is chronicled. For a description 
of their journey to Shanghai, see 39–50.
23 Letter from W. Joachimsthal and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Breyhan, 10 VIII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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remaining 104 refugees appear in the archival file.24 The Shanghai Jewish Refu‑
gees Museum has been compiling the names of all the Jewish refugees who lived 
in Shanghai in a database. The following list should help to this end.
Name Birthday (month, 
day, year)
Name Birthday (month, 
day, year)
Willi Bein N/A Raimond Krueger 7/18/1944
Hedwig Berg 5/22/1890 Elias Lawenda 11/14/1884
Jenny Berg 6/1/1895 Dagobert Lewithan 7/17/1891
Samuel Berg 1/9/1889 Hugo Lewinsohn N/A




Frieda Bernstein 4/2/1898 Georg Lissner 10/19/1888
Max Brandris N/A Elise Loewenstein 4/8/1887
Claudia Brann 9/22/1883 Eva Luedecke 10/8/1913
Max Brann N/A (Hans) Achim Luedecke 5/25/1914
Natalie Brann 1/2/1925 Jeanette Luedecke 9/27/1939
Margarete Carstens 12/4/1893 Jerry Mahrer N/A
Herta Cohn 8/25/1899 Leopold Mahrer N/A
Rosa Cohn 11/6/1877 Ruth Mahrer N/A
Erich Conin 7/31/1905 Anna Metz 4/28/1898
Else Elguther 9/7/1875 Josef Metz 4/3/1877
Ernst Elguther 8/9/1896 Arthur Michelson N/A
Georg Elguther 10/9/1881 Mary Neufeld 12 (?)/5/1925
Hans Elguther 8/26/1914 Robert Neufeld 10/18/1919
Georg Finkenstein 10/7/1878 Roger Neufeld 1/6/1947
Erna Fleskes 5/21/1910 Kurt Nothenberg 10/16/1904
Walter Fleskes 4/3/1895 Saly Pape 11/25/1879
Rudolf Friedlaender N/A Heinz Wilhelm Paul N/A
Emil Fruehling N/A Molly Paul N/A
24 Most of the names for the table come from 1) List (with handwritten date 22 I 1951) most 
likely included in a letter sent by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178; 2) The rest of the names have been culled from a number of other documents within 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178. Mathilde Lewinsohn comes from the file “Officials signing visa 
papers authorizing a refugee to enter the U.S." American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
website: http://archives.jdc.org/ (accessed 12 IV 2014).
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Arnold Fuchs 5/1/1910 Annelise Pinkus 3(?)/20/1924
Gertrud Fuchs 10/18/1879 Elisabeth Pinkus 8/26/1894
Hans Goldschmidt 5/26/1928 Heinrich Pinkus 1/31/1893
Eberhard Gordon 8/20/1895 Peter Pinkus 7/27/1925
Hilde Gordon N/A Jacob Poczter 10/12/1890
Margarete 
Gruenfeld
12/15/1903 Joachim Israel Riess N/A
Werner Gruenfeld 10/17/1909 Isabella Samuel 10/26/1873
Heinrich Hauer 3/8/1907 Charlotte Schnell 11/14/1889
Metha Hauer 12/2/1899 Max Schnell 7/30/1883
Dr. Bernard 
Hellmann
N/A Paul Schnell 8/10/1890
Gustav Heimann N/A Paula Silbermann 2/27/1902
Julie Heimann 10/6/1913 Renate Silbermann 8/25/1931
Franziska Hirsch 7/11/1892 Herbert Simonsohn ?/26/1921
Flora Hochstein 10/16/1895 Gerda Stein 3/25/1915
Max Imber 1/18/1903 Heinz Stein 11/3/1911
Charlotte Jacobsohn N/A Kurt Sternberg N/A
Herbert Jacobsohn 2/15/1895 Willi Tarnowski 11/5/1895
Evelyn Joachimsthal 12/22/1915 Josefine Tschaplitzki N/A
Miriam 
Joachimsthal
8/1/1904 Arnold Unger 5/19/1894
Walter Joachimsthal N/A Erna Vogel 3/12/1889
Herbert Karo N/A Gerhard Vogel 9/24/1922
Adolf Keibel N/A Gloria Vogel 5/18/1918
Thekla Keibel N/A Walter Vogel 10/27/1910
Charlotte Kleemann 7/9/1878 Friedrich Wartenberger 9/16/1888
Ernst Kleemann 6/13/1876 Margot Wartenberger 3/25/1899
Herbert Kohn N/A Otto Weihs 1/25/1904
Alexander Konitzki N/A Leopold Zimmermann 3/28/1884
Rosa Koppelkowski 3/21(?)/1879 Maria Zimmermann 9/13/1884
Housing the Shanghai Group
After arriving in Germany, the Shanghai Jewish refugees were housed in the 
Bremen emigrant depot station, Tirpitz Camp (Tirpitz Lager) under the direction 
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of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). Although the emigration depot 
was a place intended to accommodate persons for a few days at most, the stay for 
the Shanghai Group turned out to be much longer than had been anticipated. The 
refugees would trickle out of the camp over the next year and a half with the last 
members of the group leaving by 1 March 1952.25
Within the Tirpitz Camp the Shanghai Jews were housed in a special sec‑
tion. Men and women were separated into rooms for between six and ten per‑
sons. The rooms were barren with no decorations, floor coverings, or window 
curtains. The refugees had to make do with wooden stools and chairs, an iron 
cot with straw mattress, and two blankets. Meals were taken together with the 
other emigrants in a large mess hall. After visiting the camp, Dr. C. Breyhan, 
a representative of Bremen in the Federal Government in Bonn, remarked that 
“[the food was just as monotonous [as the accommodations] and in the long run 
not sufficient. On the day of my visit the supper consisted of a bowl of noodle 
soup, a few slices of bread with a piece of butter, along with white cheese”. He 
noted that in addition to obtaining such living materials as soap, clothes etc., the 
members of the Shanghai Group wished to go into the city in order to visit a café 
or movie theater. He pointed out that illness was a particular problem because 
for serious illnesses patients had to go to the city hospital, where costs had to be 
paid privately26. The Shanghai Group members were none too pleased with the 
accommodations. Their sentiments were relayed to Dr. Breyhan in a letter which 
pointedly compared the accommodations to those afforded them under the Nazi 
regime: “It must remain incomprehensible to us that we, the victims of the recent 
Germany, must again sleep on straw mattresses”.27 
Attempts to improve living conditions foundered in a bureaucratic morass. For 
example, after an armchair was brought in for one of the older ladies – a significant 
number of the refugees were elderly and had serious health conditions – Bremen 
Senator for Labor and Welfare, Gotthard, the man who had made the request, 
was informed by the administrators of the International Refugee Organization 
that bringing furniture into the camp was prohibited and that the armchair had 
to go.28 After the first six months, the representatives of the Shanghai Group 
expressed their concerns that conditions in the Tirpitz Camp had worsened. They 
petitioned for an increase in the funds to be provided for each refugee so that they 
could take some meals outside of the camp and purchase more supplies for hair‑
cuts, clothes, shoe soles, travel fare, toiletries, postage, repairs, theater, cinema, 
25 Report “Fürsorgeunterstützung an die Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe” by Gotthard, 
12 VI 1952, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
26 Report on the Shanghai‑Gruppe by Dr. C. Breyhan, 7 XI 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
27 Letter from Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Breyhan, 7 XI 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
28 Letter from Gotthard to Dr. C. Breyhan, 19 I 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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and tobacco. The restrictions in the camp were such that the refugees were not 
even able to prepare a cup of tea or coffee.29 Their petition for an increase in pay‑
ments, as we shall see below, was ultimately denied.
The following table shows the number of Shanghai Jewish refugees in the 
 Tirpitz camp (or the general area)30 over time starting from the date of arrival.31
32
Date Number of Refugees
                      3 July 1950 (arrival) 106 (sometimes recorded as 108)32
14 July 1950 95
20 November 1950 81 (approximate)
22 January 1951 77
14 February 1951 60
21 April 1951 48
4 September 1951 30
9 November 1951 11
28 February 1952 3
1 March 1952 0
The majority of the refugees required medical care at some point during their 
stay in Bremen. In a report drafted on 20 November 1950, a Bremen official noted 
that of the original group approximately 70, at one point or another, had to visit 
29 The requests of the Shanghai Group representatives are discussed in Dr. C. Breyhan’s report 
to the President of the Bremen Senate, 23 I 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
30 At certain times some members were not technically to be found in the camp. For example, at 
times members were housed in a sanatorium (due to their tuberculosis) or in a home for the elderly. 
These members were still counted in the general tallies. See Report by Gotthard “Weiterzahlung der 
Fürsorgeunterstützung an die Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 9 XI 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen 
4,22/2–178.
31 All documents come from Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178. The documents for the indi‑
vidual dates are as follows: For 14 VII 1950: Letter from Wilhelm Kaisen to Dr. Karl Carstens, 
14 VII 1950; For 20 XI 1950: Report by Dr. Vialon “Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 20 XI 1950; For 22 I 1951: 
List (with handwritten date 22 I 1951) most likely included in a letter sent by Dr. B. Hellmann and 
H.A. Luedecke, n.d.; For 14 II 1951: Letter from G. Heimann and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Brey‑
han, 14 II 1951; For 21 IV 1951: calculation based on 240 DM payment at 5 DM per person, Letter 
by Gotthard to Herr Lüdecke, 21 IV 1951; For 4 IX 1951: Report by Gotthard “Weiterzahlung der 
Fürsorgeunterstützung an die Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 4 IX 1951; For 9 XI 1951: Report 
by Gotthard “Weiterzahlung der Fürsorgeunterstützung an die Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 
9 XI 1951; For 28 II 1952: Report by Gotthard “Weiterzahlung der Fürsorgeunterstützung an die 
Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 28 II 1952; For 1 III 1952: Report by Gotthard “Fürsorgeun‑
terstützung an die Angehörigen der Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 12 VI 1952.
32 Most documents reported the number of refugees as 106; a few documents, such as an official 
report by Dr. Vialon, refer to 108.
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the hospital (especially for lung‑related illness). At this point it was reckoned 
that around 20 of the refugees were still not suitable for emigration either due 
to health or political reasons.33 In the 30 August 1950 report given by Dr. Hugo 
Lewinsohn, a refugee himself and the former chief doctor of the Jewish refugee 
hospital in Shanghai, 25 of the original 106 refugees sustained permanent health 
problems as a result of their internment in the Shanghai Designated Area.
Illness Number of Refugees
Tuberculosis 12
Malaria  6
Serious Stomach and/or Intestinal Illnesses  6
Skin Disease  1
 
In addition to these cases, Lewinsohn noted that many of the refugees also 
suffered psychological problems due to how they had been treated by the Japa‑
nese in the Designated Area.34
Opening Requests for Restitution
Within two weeks of their arrival, the members of the Shanghai Group compiled 
testimonials regarding the losses that the members suffered as a result of the Nazi 
policies within Germany, the emigration process from Germany to Shanghai, 
and the internment in the Shanghai Designated Area to their 1) body, health, and 
liberty; 2) property and fortune; 3) financial advancement; and 4) pensions. These 
testimonials were sent along with a cover letter by two representatives of the group, 
Dr. H. Lewinsohn and Dr. B. Hellmann, to the Ministerial Director Dr. Kleeberg 
of the Federal Chancellor’s Office on 14 July 1950. The members of the Shanghai 
Group intended to initiate the process by which they would be compensated for 
their losses. Lewinsohn and Hellmann wrote, “We know that the Federal Chancellor 
especially seeks to secure our wellbeing, and we are confident, that our proposals 
will be resolved the soonest with your friendly support”. The need was urgent, 
Lewinsohn and Hellmann claimed, for the journey had been long and arduous. 
They expressed the hope that the state would deal with the claims rapidly.35
33 An example of a refugee who was encountering difficulty for “political” reasons was a man 
who had worked as a musician in a Russian establishment. Report by Dr. Vialon “Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 
20 XI 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178.
34 Report by Dr. Hugo Lewinsohn, “Gesundheitschaedigungen zurueckzufuehren auf den 
Aufenthalt im ‘Ghetto’ in Shanghai,” 1 IX 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
35 Letter from Dr. H. Lewinsohn and Dr. B. Hellmann to Ministerial Direktor Dr. Kleeberg 
dated 14 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178.
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Three days later, on 17 July 1950, Hellmann along with another representative 
of the Shanghai Group, H.A. Luedecke had a series of meetings with various 
Federal Government officials in Bonn. For example, they met with representatives 
from the Refugee Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Interior. 
In the latter ministry they were told that the care of the Shanghai Group fell 
under “Welfare Affairs” and that although it was desired that their demand that 
each person be granted 100 DM would be met, such compensation would have 
to await the decision of the Interior Minister.
Meanwhile, Dr. C. Breyhan, the Bremen official who served as the liaison 
between the Bremen Senate, the Federal Government, and the Shanghai Group 
met with President Öftering from the Federal Ministry of Finance. Öftering was 
already informed on the matter and told Breyhan that “sufficient funds were 
currently not available in the federal budget and that the care and the completion 
of refund claims are to be a matter for the states”. In response Breyhan pointed 
out that the Shanghai Group in West Germany had no state status.36 Given that 
the Jews had been placed into the Designated Area in Shanghai on the grounds 
that they were “stateless”, it seems that history was now repeating itself as farce.
Given their desire to claim restitution from the Federal Government, the 
Shanghai Jews set to documenting their suffering in Germany and China. As 
such, the correspondence between the representatives of the Shanghai Jews 
and the German officials reveals some of the earliest accounts of the Shanghai 
 Designated Area and German concentration camps to be written after the Second 
World War. 
Documenting the Shanghai Experience
Two representatives of the Shanghai Group, Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, 
sent a long report of the Shanghai Designated Area to government officials 
in Bremen.37 In their report Hellmann and Luedecke described the Hongkou 
section as having been “densely populated” by the Chinese, the majority of whom 
were of the “Kuli” (coolie) class. Hellmann and Luedecke characterized the 
coolie class as generally making about one‑twentieth of a European. The houses 
in the district were of Chinese construction style and were “almost completely 
without plumbing, without bathing or showering opportunities and infested with 
vermin of all sorts”. In the same area that would suit six European houses, there 
were 100 Chinese houses. Roads and alleys were simply used as toilets and the 
terrible sanitary conditions led to high mortality rates among this group of poor 
36 Breyhan report dated 20 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178.
37 Report “Memorandum ueber die Ghetto‑Internierung der juedischen Fluechlinge in Shang‑
hai” by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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Chinese “and consequently also for the European refugee population”. According 
to Hellmann’s and Luedecke’s reckoning, some 19,000 refugees had to reside 
in the Designated Area. Those who still had the means paid inflated prices for 
their new dwellings, while the rest of the refugees moved into refugee barracks. 
Each of these barracks housed approximately 1,500 refugees in quarters in which 
there were 10 persons living together in 20 square‑meter rooms. 
Hellmann and Luedecke pointed out that the Hongkou section was a par‑
ticularly dangerous place in which to live. First, given that it is a port and indus‑
trial area, it was always in jeopardy of bombardment. Second, the coupling of 
the unsanitary living conditions and the Chinese climate always posed a latent 
threat of an epidemic outbreak. Third, the administrators of the Designated Area 
handed out severe punishments that often led to death. Hellmann and Luedecke 
explained that the Designated Area was only partly bordered by walls with other 
areas being marked instead by signposts that announced that it was forbidden 
to pass. All the entrances were guarded by police and military. A specific section 
of the Office for the Shanghai Stateless Refugees Affairs was in charge of granting 
permission for certain refugees to cross. Permission was only granted for specific 
reasons and for designated hours along a designated route. Every transgression 
of the proclamation had hard consequences and punishments including physical 
beatings and confinement. A prison sentence was tantamount to a death penalty 
for the majority of those confined became infected with typhus.38
Hellmann and Luedecke included individual testimonies of the Shanghai 
experience in their report. Of the testimonies provided with the report, those of 
Ernst E. Elguther, Dr. Hugo Lewinsohn, and Hans Achim Luedecke himself, are 
particularly informative and are presented here in English translation:
Ernst E. Elguther39: (writing on behalf of himself, his father, mother, and brother)
…This regulation [the Japanese proclamation that created the Designated Area 
for Stateless Persons] forced us to abandon our apartment at the greatest financial 
loss…thus, to exchange an apartment equipped with every modern luxury for 
a small room in a completely squalid, Chinese house under the pressure of 
the Japanese and with the payment of a great indemnity to the so‑called trade 
partner… I myself received no such pass [to enter and leave the Designated Area] 
from the Japanese, so I was completely without work. My brother was so impeded 
by the restrictions associated with his pass that he was not once in the position 
to earn half his livelihood. On account of this deprivation of liberty, we became 
impoverished at this time because we had to live off our assets and support our elderly 
parents. Violations or alleged violations were punished severely by the Japanese. 
From inhumane imprisonment, physical abuse to sadistic torture, the latter
38 Report “Memorandum ueber die Ghetto‑Internierung der juedischen Fluechlinge 
in Shanghai” by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
39 Individual testimonies accompanying report “Memorandum ueber die Ghetto‑Internierung 
der juedischen Fluechlinge in Shanghai” by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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 especially in the so‑called Bridge House, the headquarters of the Japanese police. 
I myself repeatedly witnessed how men and women were struck, kicked, and 
even pistol‑whipped, especially upon the application for the special pass…. In 
particular I am aware that many of those who were imprisoned under inhumane 
conditions died as a result of this imprisonment, particularly of epidemic plagues 
and infectious diseases that they contracted during their detention.
Dr. Hugo Lewinsohn40:
In my position as chief physician of the Hongkou Hospital and Outpatient 
Department, I had a good view into the state of health and the hygienic conditions 
of the emigrants living in the Ghetto.
The assigned living space was so small that the rooms had to be overfilled 
to the extent that sometimes four to six people had to find accommodation in one 
room. Consequently, the transmission of the frequently occurring infectious 
diseases found in Shanghai, such as tuberculosis, typhus, typhoid fever, dysentery 
and coeliac disease was very great.
Through the detention in the Ghetto, the opportunity to work was taken away 
from most emigrants. As a result of the Pacific War, the relief funds could no 
longer be transported to Shanghai in the necessary scale. The supply of essential 
food and medicine was inadequate, so that soon malnourishment and allergic 
illnesses set in. Public parks, baths, and recreation sites were forbidden.
Already in the summer of 1943, a large number of deaths could be reckoned 
among the malnourished emigrants. The extreme low‑calorie diet and the 
weakened bodies were not able to withstand an infectious disease.
During the years 1944–1945, the living conditions had become even worse. 
The Hongkou emigrant community of approximately 16,000 people had 
registered a decline of approximately 3,000 deaths. [This was an] alarmingly 
high mortality rate.
 The Ghetto decree of the Japanese and the resulting deprivation of liberty 
with all its consequences came about, according to the best of my knowledge and 
experience, from pressure by the resident German authorities in Shanghai, China.
Hans Achim Luedecke41:
[Note: The top of the original document is missing; thus, the translation starts 
in mid‑sentence.] 
…forced to move into a marked off sector in Hongkou, Shanghai. Despite months 
of effort it was not possible for me to leave this sector for half a year. In the sector 
I took on the volunteer leadership of the so‑called Work Department, a division 
of the Church Fund of the emigrant‑founded Organization for the Control of 
Distress. Through [my] participation on the board meetings of this organization 
the following things are known to me.
40 Individual testimonies accompanying report “Memorandum ueber die Ghetto‑Internierung 
der juedischen Fluechlinge in Shanghai” by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
41 Individual testimonies accompanying report “Memorandum ueber die Ghetto‑Internierung 
der juedischen Fluechlinge in Shanghai” by Dr. B. Hellmann and H.A. Luedecke, n.d., Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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The sector for the Ghetto was arranged so that air strikes to vital areas would have 
to encounter the emigrants first. On the one side the area bordered on the most 
vital docks and on the other side were plants and other important firms. Directly 
adjacent in the Wayside Road was the only factory that dealt with the manufacture 
of airplane parts. Obviously, this location was selected so that the American air 
force would avoid bombing these districts. In fact, this assumption was correct 
save for one exception in which an attack claimed the lives of over two thousand 
people when the Ghetto was hit42.
The selected sector was in every respect unsuitable for Europeans, as there 
were no buildings according to normal standards there for Europeans to use. The 
sector was formerly occupied exclusively by Chinese workers and coolies, whose 
living standards lay completely beneath that of Europeans. There was in the whole 
area no sewage system, which often had disastrous consequences, especially du‑
ring the hot summer months. Consequently, deadly cases of dysentery were daily 
occurrences during six months of the year. Washing and bathing facilities were 
not consistently available and skin diseases of the gravest kind prevailed among 
children.
Food, which according to the laws of war should have been provided by the 
Japanese, was entirely left to voluntary charity, mostly of the emigrants themsel‑
ves. Given that, after the Ghetto decree almost everyone in this group was without 
work and income, relief was necessary after a few months. After six months it had 
progressed so that at least the elderly and children each could be provided with 
one warm meal per day, however still only with the most primitive means.
The application of funds was achieved at times only from the sale of the goods 
and chattels of the emigrants. The streets in the district were filled daily by hundreds 
of emigrants, who traded the last [of their possessions] to the Chinese. Everything 
was sold to the extent that ultimately thousands of emigrants were seen on the 
streets only with clothes made out of flour sacks.
Forced Labor: Columns of emigrants were drafted into forced labor by the 
Japanese. It consisted for the most part in clean‑up work but also inside the area all 
emigrants were obligated to dig ditches that were intended for defense.
Demarcation and Security: The district was in places circumscribed by walls, 
while in other places guard posts were stationed where streets crossed the sector. 
The security was primarily carried out by the emigrants themselves, if the so‑called 
Pao Chia was used43. These posts were in turn supervised by the police and the 
Japanese armed forces. It was a constant terror sustained through control and 
supervision. Fustigation and detention were common. A number of emigrants 
died during the detention, while others disappeared completely without a trace, 
and the corpses from still others were found in the river.
Remarks: In Hongkou Mr. Luedecke contracted a skin disease that will reduce 
his capacity to work for the remainder of his life44.
42 Luedecke clearly was reporting total deaths (Jews and Chinese) with this figure. Historian 
David Kranzler notes that the bombing claimed a total of 250 lives (31 of them being Jews). 
Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis & Jews, 552.
43 Pao Chia (the current Pinyin is Baojia) refers to a community watch system. Although Pao 
Chia is not italicized in the original document it has been italicized here to adhere to standard 
usage.
44 The “Remarks” are part of the original document.
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Documenting Concentration Camp Experiences45
Thirteen members of the Shanghai Group had been imprisoned in German 
concentration camps prior to fleeing to Shanghai. Their combined duration of 
detention was roughly 168 months (or 14 years).46 The representatives of the 
Shanghai Group hoped that these thirteen men would be compensated for this 
time of imprisonment. The bleak history of these thirteen men began on 9 March 
1933 – about a month and a half after Hitler took office as Chancellor and just days 
after the Reichstag fire and March elections – when the newspaper advertisement 
representative Dagobert Lewithan was arrested for political reasons and detained 
in the infamous Columbia House Prison in Berlin for nearly a year and a half.47 
It ultimately took the intervention of the District Mayor, Mr. Beetz, for Lewithan 
to be released in August 1934. Four years later, on 11 June 1938, Lewithan was 
arrested again and taken to Buchenwald Concentration Camp where he stayed 
until 9 February 1939.
Heinz Wilhelm Paul, a married salesman, was arrested in January 1936 at the 
border town Bad Schandau as he was returning from a trip to Czechoslovakia. 
Paul was charged with the crime of Rassenschande (“racial defilement”) and 
sentenced by the State Court in Dresden to a prison term of 18 months. Racial 
defilement was a crime according to the Law for the Protection of German Blood 
and German Honor that was promulgated on 15 September 1935 as one of the 
infamous Nuremberg Laws. The law forbade sexual relations between Aryans and 
non‑Aryans. When the term of Paul’s sentence ended in mid‑August 1937, he 
was transferred by the Gestapo directly from the prison in Bautzen to the Dachau 
Concentration Camp.48 In Dachau he was quartered in Block 6, Room 3. The block 
leader was Heinz Eschen49 and the room leader was August Cohn.50 The whole 
room was later transferred to Block 4, Room 3 in newly constructed barracks. 
45 Although the general issue of reparations had not been settled, a law had been promulgated 
pertaining to the payments to be issued to those who had been interned in German concentration 
camps. The majority of the information provided in this section comes from signed testimonies that 
accompanied a letter by Shanghai Group representatives Dr. H. Lewinsohn and Dr. B. Hellmann 
regarding the compensation due to thirteen members of the Shanghai Group as a result of this law: 
Letter from Dr. H. Lewinsohn and Dr. B. Hellmann, 3 VIII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178. 
Additional footnote citations have been provided for any information within this section that has 
been drawn from documents other than the testimonies that accompanied the 3 VIII 1950 letter.
46 Handwritten notes by Dr. Breyhan accompanying report addressed to the Präsidenten des 
Senats, 9 VIII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
47 On Lewithan’s occupation: Document signed by Dagobert Lewithan, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
48 Such transfers to concentration camps after the conclusion of legal sentences became all too 
normal and were indicative of the disintegration of the rule of law in Germany.
49 Eschen would later be found hanged in Buchenwald.
50 Cohn was eventually freed from Buchenwald in 1945 and he moved to America.
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Among those imprisoned with Paul were the Communist Reichstag Deputy and 
editor of the leading Communist newspaper Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag), 
Werner Scholem; the SPD Reichstag Deputy, Ernst Heilmann; the Communist 
politician and journalist, Emil Carlebach; and Max Nelki (who would also later 
immigrate to Shanghai).51 It was also in Dachau that Paul met Artur Michelson. 
In the second week of July 1936 – two weeks before the opening of the Summer 
Olympic Games – the fishmonger Artur Michelson was returning to his hometown 
of Deutsche Krone when he was met on the train platform and arrested by the 
Gestapo. The terms of Michelson’s arrest were that he was officially put under 
Gestapo surveillance, had to register with the Gestapo every day, and was no 
longer allowed to carry out any employment. The following year Michelson was 
taken to Schneidemühl, where he was locked up for around four weeks and then 
after being transported to the police jail Alexanderplatz in Berlin, Michelson was 
ultimately sent to Dachau. After his arrival in August 1937, Michelson was given 
a concentration camp number (around 12600 or 12800 – he later could not 
remember the exact number) and taken to Block 6. In Dachau Michelson was 
mistreated to the point that he was “blinded and paralyzed”. In September 1938 
both Heinz Paul and Michelson were transferred from Dachau to Buchenwald, 
where they were quartered in the same block but different rooms. Due to the 
blindness that he had sustained while he was in Dachau, Michelson had to be 
led around while in Buchenwald.52 On 17 December 1938 Heinz Paul was 
released from Buchenwald. For the last month and a half of his detention he 
had been forced into a disciplinary battalion due to his designation as a “race 
defiler”. It was because of this designation that Paul had to wear a black and 
yellow star. As a result of mistreatment during his detention, Paul sustained 
an injury to his left foot, a pulled tendon, and frostbite.53 Artur Michelson’s 
detention in Buchenwald continued for another eight months after Paul’s release 
during the second week of August 1939. As a result of his detention, Michelson’s 
twelve fish stores and twelve fish farms in Deutsch Krone, Grenzmark Province 
and Pomerania were confiscated.54
On 23 December 1936 Josef Metz was arrested and detained in the police 
prison, Alexanderplatz. From there he was sent to the prison in Plötzensee, 
51 In 1940 both Scholem and Heilmann were killed in Buchwald. Nelki was a resident of 
Hamburg who was sent to the concentration camp for the charge of racial defilement. Information 
about Nelki is to be found on the Wiener Library website: http://www.aim25.ac.uk/cats/104/7831.
htm (accessed 1 II 2012).
52 Michelson’s eyesight was later restored by an operation performed in Shanghai. Document 
signed by Artur Michelson, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
53 On Heinz Wilhelm Paul’s health: Document signed by Heinz Wilhelm Paul, 13 VII 1950, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
54 On the confiscation: Document signed by Artur Michelson, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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where he received an indictment for racial defilement. From Plötzensee he was 
then sent to prison in Tegel. In April 1937 his case came up and he was given 
the sentence of nine months. In June 1938 Metz was newly arrested and sent 
to the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. During the last few months of Metz’s 
imprisonment in Sachsenhausen, he was joined by another future member of the 
Shanghai Group, Samuel Berg.
The goldsmith Samuel Berg was arrested during early June 1938 in Leipzig and 
sent to Sachsenhausen after staying a night in the police jail. In Sachsenhausen 
Berg was given the camp number 1428 and at first quartered in Block 1 and then 
Block 7. During his detention he sustained a fracture from which effects he would 
still suffer years later in the Bremen IRO Camp.55 In Sachsenhausen Berg met 
Josef Metz as well as another inmate, who would eventually flee Germany for 
Shanghai, Rudolf Joryez. Berg was released from Sachsenhausen on 5 September 
1938. When Berg returned from the camp he found that his precious metal 
business had been emptied. A warehouse and machines worth approximately 
40,000 RM had disappeared.56 Josef Metz was released from Sachsenhausen 
two days after Berg, on 7 September 1938. As a result of the mistreatment that 
Metz endured during the period of his detention, his health was such that he 
required medical therapy and his capacity to work was diminished. As a result he 
would later have to be supported by others in Shanghai.57
On 26 May 1937 Werner Philipp Gruenfeld was arrested by the Gestapo 
in Bremen and held in a remand prison until September. At that time he was 
sent to Berlin Moabit, where on 14 October 1937 he was sentenced to one year 
and three months for racial defilement. At the end of the sentence, on 4 February 
1939 he was transferred directly to the Gestapo at the police prison in Berlin, 
Alexanderplatz, and held there until 21 June 1939. On the next day he was taken 
to Buchenwald, where he was detained for another month. Gruenfeld had been 
deprived of his liberty for over two years and suffered from a chronic heart 
problem as a result of his detention.58
On 13 June 1938 the merchant Heinrich Pinkus was arrested in Neisse; the next 
day the design engineer Emil Fruehling was arrested in his apartment in Berlin.59 
Pinkus and Fruehling were both taken to Buchenwald. Pinkus – whose health 
55 On the fracture: Document signed by Samuel Berg, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
56 On Berg’s business losses: Document signed by Samuel Berg, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
57 On the health and financial effects of Metz’s detention: Unsigned Josef Metz document, 
13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
58 On the heart problem: Document signed by Werner Philipp Gruenfeld, 13 VII 1950, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
59 On Fruehling’s occupation: Document signed by Emil Fruehling, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
ZH_Gdansk_5.indd   131 2014‑05‑27   22:41:23
132 KEVIN OSTOYICH
was compromised by his detention to the point that his capacity to work was 
diminished – was released from Buchenwald on 5 January 1939.60 While he was 
imprisoned, Pinkus’ business was destroyed during Reichskristallnacht (Night 
of Broken Glass) that took place on 9/10 November 1938 (see below) and then 
“aryanized”.61 Fruehling stayed in the camp until 15 June 1939. Fruehling had 
owned two patents for door locks and was forced to sell the patents (and his claim 
to future royalties) for a quarter of what they were worth.62 
The Night of Broken Glass was one of the most notorious events for Germany’s 
Jews. Four future members of the Shanghai Group were rounded up at this time. 
The women’s clothing merchant Georg Lissner was arrested in his apartment 
in Berlin and taken to Sachsenhausen, where he stayed until being released on 
16 December 193863. Lissner’s women’s clothing business was “aryanized”.64 The 
paper merchant Georg Finkenstein and the textile merchant Kurt Nothenberg were 
both arrested in Breslau and taken to Buchenwald.65 Finkenstein had run a paper 
business in Breslau but was forced to close it in 1935 and then struggled to feed 
himself through playing the piano.66 Arnold Unger was arrested in Braunschweig 
and taken to Buchenwald. Finkenstein – who would suffer from neuropathy as 
a result of his detention – was released on 20 December 1938. Nothenberg – who 
contracted lung disease as a result of his detention – was released on either 14 or 
15 December. Nothenberg was forced to give up his textile business. Arnold 
Unger left Buchenwald on 1 February 1939.67 
A few days after the Night of Broken Glass, Joachim Israel Riess was arrested 
on 13 November at the Dutch border and was eventually sent to Dachau. In 
Dachau Riess was quartered in Bock 21, Room 4 (being transferred to another 
Block the following month). He was released from Dachau on 1 March 1939. 
He was not given a discharge certificate; rather he was merely given a document 
60 On Heinrich Pinkus’ health: Document signed by Heinrich Pinkus, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
61 On the destruction and aryanization of Pinkus’ business: Document signed by Heinrich 
Pinkus, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
62 On the patents: Document signed by Emil Fruehling, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
63 On Lissner’s occupation: Document signed by Georg Lissner, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
64 On Lissner’s business being aryanized: Document signed by Georg Lissner, 13 VII 1950, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
65 On Finkenstein’s occupation: Document signed by Georg Finkenstein, 13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178; on Nothenberg’s occupation: Document signed by Kurt Nothenberg, 
13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
66 On the paper business and piano playing: Document signed by Georg Finkenstein, 
13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
67 On Finkenstein’s neuropathy: Document signed by Georg Finkenstein dated 13 VII 1950. 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178; On Nothenberg’s lung disease: Document signed by Kurt 
Nothenberg dated 13 VII 1950. Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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to sign that stated that he had suffered no mental or bodily harm and had gained 
20 pounds during the detention. In fact, Riess had not only lost 25 pounds but 
also had many of his teeth knocked out during his detention in Dachau.68 More‑
over, the business for which Riess had worked was destroyed and the employer 
taken prisoner. Thus, Riess had no job to which to return.69
The following table records the total time that the thirteen men spent in con‑
centration camps in Germany:
Name Months Days
Samuel Berg 4
Georg Finkenstein 1 10
Emil Fruehling 12
Werner Philipp Gruenfeld 25 27
Dagobert Lewithan 25
Georg Lissner 1 6
Josef Metz 11 26
Artur Michelson 37
Kurt Nothenberg 1 6
Heinz Wilhelm Paul 35
Heinrich Pinkus 6 24
Joachim Israel Riess 3 17
Arnold Unger 2 23
Total (Based on 30 days/
month) 167 19
Disappointment and Frustration
Money quickly became a major point of disappointment and frustration for 
the Shanghai Group. The group not only wanted sufficient funds to be allocated 
for their accommodation in Bremen but, as we have seen above, hoped to be 
compensated for their losses and suffering in reparation payments. They would 
ultimately be disappointed on both accounts.
68 On Joachim Israel Riess’ teeth: Document signed by Joachim Israel Riess, 13 VII 1950, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
69 On Joachim Israel Riess’ loss of employment: Document signed by Joachim Israel Riess, 
13 VII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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When the arrangement was struck between Adenauer and Kaisen before the 
arrival of the Shanghai Group in July 1950, it was agreed that 130,000 DM would 
be allocated for the group to cover housing and medical costs. Of this total, 
100,000 DM was to be supplied by the Federal Government and 30,000 by the 
Bremen State. The funds were to cover the costs of accommodations for 
a projected stay of three months; however, at the end of those three months, it 
became clear that the initial assumption had been incorrect and that the stay 
would last another three months. For this reason Kaisen wrote to Adenauer 
with a request for an additional 70,000 DM from the Federal Government.70 
Records show that for the period between July 1950 and January 1951 the 
Federal Government transferred a total of 128,500 DM to Bremen in order to cover 
various costs related to the Shanghai Group.71
Whereas government officials were more exclusively concerned about 
covering the accommodation costs of the Shanghai Jews for what was hoped to be 
a temporary stay, the representatives of the Shanghai Group focused their attention 
on both accommodation and restitution payments. By 10 August 1950, ten of the 
87 refugees who had been detained in the Designated Area had already left the 
group in Bremen to repatriate within Germany. Thus, that August representatives 
of the Shanghai Group petitioned for restitution payments to be made for the 77 
remaining members of their group who had been detained in the Designated Area. 
The period of detention had lasted 26 months and the representatives reckoned that 
at 150 DM per person per month the total the group was owed would be around 
300,000 DM (or 3,900 DM per person). In the interest of the quickest possible 
rectification of the issue, representatives declared that the group would be ready 
to accept a lump sum payment of an additional 100,000 DM to rectify all claims 
of this group in the matters of the deprivation of liberty in China and in German 
concentration camps.72 
The representatives of the Shanghai Jews offered this solution with the inten‑
tion of preventing a “paper war”. Moreover, they added that such a solution 
“would be in the interest of all, because, on the one hand, the money paid 
to us would be spent in Bremen and on the other hand, we would really be 
helped through this because with this we would have the opportunity to cre‑
ate things for us here in Germany that would facilitate the beginning of a new 
existence abroad”.73 
70 Letter from Wilhelm Kaisen to Dr. Konrad Adenauer, 7 X 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
71 Letter from Dr. C. Breyhan to Herr Regierungsrat Lindert, 24 I 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
72 Letter from W. Joachimsthal and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Breyhan, 10 VIII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
73 Letter from W. Joachimsthal and H.A. Luedecke to Dr. C. Breyhan, 10 VIII 1950, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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It appeared, however, that the government officials were not so concerned 
about preventing a paper war. It was reported that the Shanghai Group 
representatives were told in person that their request for 100,000 DM as 
a reparation payment had “little chance” of success.74 Moreover, on 6 December 
1950 there was a conversation in the Federal Ministry of Interior between 
federal officials and Bremen representatives and it was later reported that 
when the issue of reparation payments was broached, the representatives of 
the Federal Ministries placed no importance on combining payments for the 
general welfare of the refugees with reparations.75 Not only were government 
officials in no hurry to respond to the Shanghai Group’s requests for reparation 
payments, it was at this time that they decided to scale back payments for the 
refugees’ accommodations in Bremen. From the period July to December 1950 
in addition to payments for general accommodations, an additional 1400 DM 
had been paid, thus it was estimated that around 230 DM had been provided 
per month per refugee.76 However, from 1 January 1951 on each member of the 
Shanghai Group would be allotted 50 DM per month. 35 DM would be paid 
for dependents over 16 years of age and 25 DM would be paid for dependents 
under 16 years of age.77 
The representatives of the Shanghai Jews found it particularly problematic 
that whereas their payments were being slashed, payments to the parallel 
group of Shanghai refugees living in the International Refugee Organization 
camp in Bavaria were actually being increased.78 In his criticism, the Shanghai 
Jewish representative Luedecke was careful not to overstate the plight of the 
refugees in Bremen vis‑à‑vis the refugees in Bavaria. He noted that he had 
recently visited the IRO Camp Föhrenwald in Bavaria and had to admit that 
although the refugees there had more opportunities to cook for themselves, 
they “live in a type of filth and misery of which one from a better position 
cannot speak”.79 What Luedecke did object to was the implication that, 
whereas living costs for refugees had increased in Bavaria, they had somehow 
decreased in Bremen. Luedecke contacted numerous officials either in person 
74 Report by Dr. Vialon “Shanghai‑Gruppe,” 20 XI 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178.
75 Report by Dr. Karl Carstens “Shanghai Gruppe…,” 7 XII 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
76 Letter from Dr. Öftering to the Federal Minister of Interior, 2 IV 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
77 The decision came from the Federal Minister of Interior on 22 XII 1950. Information on the 
decision can be found in Gotthard’s Report “Shanghai‑Gruppe; Versorgung bis zum 31.3.1951,” 
22 II 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
78 This was in fact the case; a report notes an increase of the payment to 500 DM a month per 
refugee from the old level of 300 DM. Report by Bundesminister der Finanzen Öftering addressed 
to the Bundesminister des Innern, 2 IV 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
79 Letter from H.A. Luedecke to Dr. Breyhan, 15 III 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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or in writing and hoped that the monthly allotment would be increased to at 
least double the 50 DM that had been decided upon.80
Luedecke’s response to the government’s decision to set payments at 50 DM 
from 1 January 1951 on generated a mountain of paperwork as the issue moved 
through the warren of state and federal governments. A question that arose from 
the bureaucratic communications was whether increased funds could be justified 
if the payments were characterized as “War Relief ” or “General Welfare Aid”. 
Ultimately, such justifications were rejected by the Federal Ministry of Finance 
on both accounts.81 Luedecke became increasingly frustrated in his futile quest 
to reverse the decision to set payments at 50 DM after 1 January 1950. Eventu‑
ally, in March 1951 Luedecke expressed this frustration with how the issue of 
payments was being dealt with by the various departments within the Federal 
Ministry of Finance by requesting that Dr. Breyhan make the Finance Minister 
familiar with the passage from Heinrich Heine’s The Grenadiers: “And as neither 
wished to suffer one paying for the other, neither of the two paid”.82
Luedecke did score a minor victory, however, in his bid to obtain extra 
funds for religious ceremonies. A total of 240 DM (5 DM per person) were 
distributed for this purpose. The approval of these funds – funds to support the 
celebration of religious rituals for Jews who had fled the Third Reich some fifteen 
years before – ironically was granted by the Bremen Senate on 20 April 1951, 
the 62nd anniversary of Adolf Hitler’s birth.83 
Unfortunately, the Bremen file is not conclusive on the matter of reparations 
for the Shanghai members. The file ends on a bleak note in late 1953 with a few 
documents alluding to a lawsuit that one of the Shanghai Jews, the concentration 
camp survivor Arthur Michelson, opened against the Freie Hansestadt Bremen 
over the issue of reparations. The German road to reparations for Jewish victims 
would be a twisted and troubled one that would extend well beyond the Cold 
War that was just beginning when the Shanghai Jews arrived in Bremen in 1950. 
In his book Escape to Shanghai, James R. Ross claims that eventually the Federal 
Republic of Germany paid 5,000 DM to Jewish refugees who lived in the Shanghai 
Designated Area and an additional 5,000 DM to those who “continued their 
80 See, for example, the report that Dr. Breyhan sent to the President of the Senate after a meeting 
with Luedecke: Dr. Breyhan Report “Shanghai‑Gruppe 1951…,” 23 I 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
81 Letter by Hartmann and Hilse of the Federal Ministry of Finance titled “Weitere zusätzliche 
Leistungen für die Angehörgen der Bremer Shanghai‑Gruppe” to the Federal Minister of Interior, 
10 III 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178. See as well Dr. Öftering’s decision not to increase the 
payments for the Shanghai Group of Bremern: Letter from Dr. Öftering to the Federal Minister of 
Interior, 2 IV 1950, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
82 My translation. Letter from H.A. Luedecke to Dr. Breyhan, 15 III 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 
4,22/2–178.
83 Letter by Gotthard to H.A. Luedecke, 21 IV 1951, Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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education”. Ross claims further that payments were eventually made decades later 
to those refugees who had returned to what became East Germany and had never 
received any reparations from the German Democratic Republic.84
A Lukewarm Welcome and a Confidential Case
The Shanghai Group arrived in a very different Germany than the one 
they had left. The German eagle was still trying to emerge from the ashes of 
Hitler’s destructive Third Reich; Adenauer’s Germany was entering its path 
to normalization. Along this new course, the German stance toward Jews was 
changing. The Shanghai Group provided an early opportunity for the Germans 
to show that they were truly a new land with a new view towards humanity. 
Although there were those who questioned what debt Germans owed to Jews who 
had been interned in a Japanese “Ghetto” on Chinese soil, the federal government 
and the Bremen Senate took the position that Germany would have to open its 
doors to these returning Jews. The problem was that neither Adenauer nor Kaisen 
foresaw how long the Jews would have to stay in Germany. The members of the 
Shanghai Group – a majority of whom were sick and weary – most decidedly 
did not want to be “back on straw” in Germany but, given the slow bureaucratic 
wheels of American immigration policy, that is where they found themselves 
until they could journey back to the United States.
Although Adenauer and Kaisen had welcomed these Jews, the members of the 
Shanghai Group quickly became skeptical of the warmth behind that welcome. 
The fact of the matter was that the Shanghai Group had arrived before the 
issue of reparations for the Holocaust was settled; as such, no one quite knew 
how to provide for these refugees. The representatives of the Shanghai Group 
submitted request after request in hopes that their living conditions in the 
camp would be improved and the funds allotted to them would be increased. 
Although the federal and state governments did provide financial support for the 
Shanghai Jewish refugees, this support was not at the level the Shanghai Group 
representatives had requested and the slow and tangled bureaucratic mechanism 
by which the funds were distributed left the members of the Shanghai Group 
increasingly frustrated with the country in which they most decidedly did not want 
to be living and from which they had gone halfway around the globe to escape.
The time has come to draw more attention to the ways in which the history 
of the Shanghai Jewish refugees affected events and policies after the Second 
World War, particularly in Germany. The present article has been written with 
the intention of helping move the historiography of the Shanghai Jews in this 
direction. The case of the 106 members of the Shanghai Group who arrived 
84 Ross, Escape to Shanghai, 255.
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in Bremen in 1950 reveals that Adenauer’s Germany had an early opportunity 
to show the world that the new Federal Republic of Germany would start to try 
to heal the great wounds it had opened in Europe. But it seems that the officials 
missed this opportunity, choosing instead to keep the case of the Shanghai Jews 
under wraps. Regarding the latter, an April 1953 report by the then Bremen offi‑
cial and future President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Karl Carstens, 
is particularly illuminating. When referring to the case of the Shanghai Group, 
Carstens noted that Bremen officials and federal government officials had always 
dealt with  the issue with strict confidentiality for fear that other such victims 
would follow the example of the Shanghai Group in requesting concessions for 
their suffering.85 Although the Shanghai Group arrived in Bremen in 1950, the 
time for real and open healing in Germany apparently did not.
Kevin Ostoyich
“Back on Straw”: The Experience of Shanghai Jewish Refugees in Bremen after 
Escaping German National Socialism, Enduring a Japanese “Designated Area”, 
and Fleeing Chinese Communism
Summary
The article provides information on a group of 106 Shanghai Jewish refugees who 
returned to Germany in July 1950 after an unsuccessful attempt to immigrate to the 
United States. By an arrangement negotiated between German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and the Mayor of Bremen, Wilhelm Kaisen the refugees were lodged in the 
Tirpitz Camp in Bremen until they could get permission to reenter the United States. 
The article provides information on 1) the experiences that thirteen of the members of 
the Shanghai Group had endured in German concentration camps during the 1930s; 
2)  the Shanghai Designated Area set up in the Hongkou district of Shanghai by the 
Japanese occupying forces in 1943; 3) the journey to Bremen in 1950; 4) the names (and 
birthdates when available) of 102 members of the Shanghai Group, their numbers over 
time in the Tirpitz Camp, and the health status of the members; 5) conditions in the 
Tirpitz Camp in Bremen; and 6) the activities of German federal and state officials to 
address the immediate needs of the Shanghai Jewish refugees during the time when the 
issue of German reparation payments to Jews had yet to be determined. The archival file 
upon which the article is based (Staatsarchiv Bremen 4,22/2–178) reveals that despite the 
initial good intentions by Adenauer and Kaisen, the experience of the Shanghai Jewish 
refugees became strained as their stay in the camp became prolonged and their requests 
for more hospitable accommodation and more funds met with bureaucratic red tape.
85 Report by Dr. Karl Carstens to the President of the Bremen Senate, 9 IV 1953, Staatsarchiv 
Bremen, 4,22/2–178.
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